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THE RENAISSANCE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TRIAL LAWYER
J. SKELLY WRIGHT*
Criminal law, long the stepchild of the law school and the lawyer, is
showing signs of a return to acceptability. Once law school freshmen
dozed through this required course while freshmen law teachers, com-
pelled by their lack of seniority to teach it, droned through their notes.
Now bright-eyed young men and women, stimulated and directed by
creative and provocative lecturers, debate the concepts of culpability,
capacity, competence, equal justice, right to counsel, and the defendant's
right to a fair trial in relation to the rights of television and the press
to cover fully not only the trial itself but also the investigation which led
to the trial.
This resurgence of interest in the criminal law is also reflected in the
flood of law review articles pouring out of the law schools discreetly
telling the bench and bar alike to become aware of new approaches to
criminal justice. The annual applications for judicial clerkships confirm
that criminal law is on the way back. The superior students, the only
ones who make applications to be law clerks, seem to be deeply committed
to the importance of criminal law. Many of them go on to teach it as
law schools are reaching out for these committed young people with
attractive offers. Thus, this renewed interest in the criminal law is
transmitted from school to school.
One wonders what caused the change-what created all the interest.
This author would like to think that the idealism in these young men
has been sparked by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the
area of the criminal law. For years we have professed equality before the
law, reaffirming that our Bill of Rights is applicable to all our citizens
and that it actually means what it says. However, those who are older
in the law know full well that to the great majority of defendants in
criminal cases, the ones too poor to hire competent counsel, these profes-
sions of equality have been a cruel hoax. The kind of trial a defendant
received did depend on the condition of his pocketbook, and the quality
of our justice did depend, to some degree at least, on who was receiving it.
The Supreme Court has sought to make good the constitutional promise
of equality to rich and poor alike by interpreting the Bill of Rights as a
code of law rather than as material for Fourth of July speeches. It is this
new approach to equal justice that has made criminal law evangelists of
bright young people and has brought about the renaissance of the
criminal law.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
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I
The birthplace of the renaissance was Adamson v. California,' decided
by the Supreme Court in 1947. In an old case, Barron v. Baltimore,2
decided before the Civil War, the Court had held that the Bill of Rights
was binding only on the national government. The question presented in
Adamson was whether the fourteenth amendment changed the rule of
that case, making the Bill of Rights binding on the states as well. In
Adamson, for almost eighty pages and in four separate opinions, the
Justices debated whether or not the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment were shorthand for the first eight
amendments containing the Bill of Rights. In that case, over a strong
dissent by Mr. Justice Black, with Justices Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge also dissenting, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment
was not shorthand for the first eight and that unless state action shocked
the conscience of mankind or otherwise violated our concept of ordered
liberty, it did not transgress the due process clause. Due process was to
be spelled out on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, one by one the
important portions of the Bill of Rights have been read into the four-
teenth amendment.
The first amendment freedoms have no direct relationship to the
criminal law. Understandably, however, they were the first to come under
the umbrella of the fourteenth amendment. After some delay, the other
portions of the Bill of Rights that do relate to the criminal law have
followed suit. In Betts v. Brady3 the Court limited the sixth amendment
right to counsel to capital cases in the state courts. It is a well known
fact that at the 1962 term of Court that limitation was swept away in
Gideon v. Wainwright.' The fourth amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures was held applicable to the states in
1949 in Wolf v. Colorado,5 but it was not until Mapp v. Ohio6 in 1961
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was ordered
excluded from state court proceedings.
The fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination became
part of the fourteenth in Malloy v. Hogan,7 and by virtue of Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor8 state immunity from
prosecution resulting from compelled testimony became binding on the
1. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
2. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1883).
3. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
7. 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
8. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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federal courts. Finally, in Robinson v. California9 the cruel and unusual
punishment provision of the eighth amendment was applied to the
states. Thus, with the exception of the fifth amendment's double jeop-
ardy clause and the sixth and seventh amendments' right to jury trial
provisions, most of the important protections of the Bill of Rights have
been made applicable to the states.
Much of the above is not directly related to the right to, and the
responsibility of, trial counsel. Nevertheless, these decisions are important
to a full understanding of the dramatic changes which are taking place
in the criminal law. Before undertaking a discussion of the present posture
of the right to counsel in a criminal case, a few comments on the new
approach to the right to bail provisions of the eighth amendment are
in order.
II
Bail is a barnacle on the back of the criminal law. It is an archaic
process with roots deep in history but with no attachment to current
needs. Theoretically a defendant out on bail is in the custody of his
bondsman. Thus the bondsman is allowed to charge a modest stipend,
10 per cent of the bond, for the service he renders and the risk he runs.
Actually a defendant on bond is in the custody of no one, and the police
or the FBI are much more familiar with his whereabouts than is his
bondsman. Moreover, if the defendant fails to appear for trial, it is the
FBI or the police who pick him up, yet the bondsman gets the fee. It is
no wonder that the bonding business has been the source of scandal and
unsavory conduct on the part of public officials who become too friendly
with bondsmen. In short, the bondsman gets paid for rendering no real
service, and something for nothing often spells trouble.
There are laws which make it a criminal offense for a defendant to
fail to appear in court. Sometimes the penalty for violation is more severe
than that for the crime originally charged. A defendant bent on abscond-
ing would certainly be more impressed with a prison sentence for failing
to appear than he would with forfeiture of his bond. Consequently, it
seems obvious that the fact the defendant makes bail is unrelated to the
possibility of his non-appearance. Thus the process of bail serves no
useful purpose. If the threat of prosecution for non-appearance is in-
effective, the threat of bail forfeiture certainly will not insure the defen-
dant's presence at trial.
In addition to being useless, the requirement of bail can work great
injustice upon those unable to pay the bondsman's fee. The poor remain
in jail where they are unable to support their families, find their wit-
nesses, or otherwise assist in the preparation of their defense. Perhaps
9. 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
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as a result of this inability to make bail, statistics ° limited to first offen-
ders show that 59 per cent of those unable to make bail are found guilty
and sentenced to jail terms, while only 10 per cent of those on bond
receive jail terms. The direct relationship between jail sentences and the
inability to make bail seems apparent.
The uselessness and the injustice of bail is being demonstrated by the
Vera Foundation Project. The project, manned by lawyers and social
workers, screens defendants in jail who are unable to make bail and
recommends the good risks for release on their own recognizance. The
dramatic results of Vera's first efforts are told by Dean McKay of New
York University:
• . . [I]n the first group of 111 [most of whom would have
remained in jail under ordinary procedures prior to a resolution
of their cases] disposed of by the courts after recommendation
for bail by the Vera study group, 66 were either acquitted or
dismissed; 33 received suspended sentences; 7 received fines;
and only 5 went to jail."
It appears that we need an expansion of the Vera approach and an
abolition of bail bonds.
III
As to the right to and the responsibility of counsel, Gideon v. Wain-
wright did not settle all the problems stemming from an accused's right
to counsel. As a matter of fact, after Gideon the Supreme Court decided
Escobedo v. Illinois,2 in which the difficult question as to when the
right to counsel begins was explored. Escobedo makes clear that if the
right to representation is to be effective it must be provided early, and
that the time commencing immediately after arrest, as far as the defen-
dant is concerned, is one of the most critical stages in the criminal
process. It is at this stage that the person arrested is brought to the
police station to be booked and, if counsel representing the accused is
not present, he is taken to a back room for interrogation. It is also during
this time that the police bring in the complaining witness to identify
the accused.
There is no way of knowing what goes on in the back rooms of police
stations except through the testimony of those present. The proceedings
conducted in those back rooms are not of record, and the only "tran-
script" of them is the policemen's testimony. Of course, the accused may
take the stand and deny that he made the statements attributed to him
10. Rankin, The Effect oj Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641, 647 (1964).
11. McKay, Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 35 U. CoLO. L. REV.
323, 327 (1963).
12. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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by the police, but there are usually three or four police present who
swear to a single version of the proceedings so that the accused's version
has very little chance of acceptance. In effect, the police have an un-
recorded trial in the police station and then give their oral version of
this trial when called upon to testify in court. It was with respect to
this police station trial that Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the
Supreme Court in Escobedo, wrote:
The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the
trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the
"right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very
hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is
already assured by pretrial examination." In re Groban, 352
U.S. 330, 344 (Black, J., dissenting). "One can imagine a
cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them have the most illustrious
counsel, now. They can't escape the noose. There is nothing that
counsel can do for them at the trial.' " Ex parte Sullivan, 107
F. Supp. 514, 517-518.1"
In order to eliminate this unequal swearing contest between policemen
and the lone defendant as to what went on in the back room of the
police station the Supreme Court held in Mallory v. United States"4 that
Rule 5(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring production
of a person arrested before a United States Commissioner "without
unnecessary delay" for instructions as to his rights to counsel and to
remain silent must be strictly enforced. The only way to enforce Rule
5(a), as the Court held, is the prophylactic process of excluding con-
fessions and admissions allegedly made by the accused during this period
of unnecessary delay.
Escobedo was an attempt to apply in a general way the broad principle
of Mallory to state proceedings. In Escobedo the police took the accused
to one of the back rooms of the police station and refused to let him
see his lawyer in spite of the fact that his lawyer was present in the
adjoining room, demanding to see him. The Court held that Escobedo's
confession obtained under these circumstances violated his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. The Court stated that the right to counsel arose
when suspicion began to focus on the individual and, since Escobedo
had already been arrested (presumably with probable cause), he was
entitled to a lawyer.
The principle announced in Escobedo is a salutary one which, if
faithfully followed in federal as well as state courts, could do much to-
ward eliminating many of the recurring problems which arise in connec-
tion with the investigation and trial of criminal cases. Escobedo in
13. Id. at 487-488.
14. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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effect says that no man may be arrested without probable cause and
that from the time of arrest onward he is entitled to the advice of
counsel. If the defendant wants to make a statement to the police with
counsel present, there will be little question as to its admissibility in
evidence. Thus, the uneven swearing contest between the defendant and
the police and the allegations and the denials of third degree should all
be eliminated from the criminal trial in state as well as in federal courts.
Of course, it is true that compliance with the principle announced in
Escobedo could interfere with police investigations as they are presently
being conducted, but there is no constitutional requirement that police
investigations follow the present pattern of making the case out of the
mouth of the accused. Ours is an accusatorial, not an inquisitorial,
system of criminal justice. Police investigations should be focused on
obtaining evidence from sources other than the accused himself. Require-
ments such as probable cause for arrest and issuance of search warrants,
right to counsel and the like may indeed handicap the police. However,
the Bill of Rights applies to police investigations as well as to the criminal
trial itself, and to allow police investigations to proceed without respect
for the Bill of Rights is to make a travesty and an hypocrisy of the
criminal trial, to say nothing of our whole system of criminal justice.
The excessive unfavorable publicity given to recognition by the courts
of the constitutional rights of a person charged with a crime has some
people understandably concerned. Police chiefs complain that they are
being "handcuffed" by the courts. These complaints are being echoed
by commentators, columnists and cartoonists who charge that the courts
are coddling criminals. Even a federal appellate judge recently wrote,
"In our concern for criminals, we should not forget that nice people
have some rights too."
This criticism of the courts reflects a basic misunderstanding of the
purpose of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was designed to pro-
tect all of us from the oppression of the state, to protect the privacy of
our homes and persons from the midnight knock on the door-the hall-
mark of the totalitarian state. The Bill of Rights allows us to be free in
the fullest sense. It attempts to draw the proper line between the state's
obligation to preserve order and the individual's right to be let alone.
The Bill of Rights says to government, state and federal: "A citizen is
presumed to be innocent of wrongdoing. If you have evidence of wrong-
doing, proceed according to law, but don't expect, and don't force, the
citizen suspected of crime to testify against himself."
Thus, the presumption of innocence and the protections of the Bill
of Rights apply to all persons. Our system of criminal justice is based
on the criminal act, of which the accused is presumed innocent, and not
association, condition, or prior record. In the eyes of the law there is no
[VoL. 4:213
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such thing in this country as "nice people" who enjoy the protections of
the Bill of Rights and the so-called criminal element who do not. The
Bill of Rights, under the presumption of innocence, protects all of us
or none of us. There is no middle ground. The sooner the "nice people"
realize this, the sooner the police will also. The police merely reflect
the community consensus. When the community wants law enforcement
according to law, it will have it. For its own protection the community
should remember that today's "nice people" may be tomorrow's "criminal
element," or vice versa, dependink upon who is calling the names. For
example, in some parts of Mississippi today the civil rights workers who
are trying to assist the Negro in registering to vote seem to be the
''criminal element" and their murderers the ''nice people."
If, in addition to alarming the citizenry with dramatic and detailed
accounts of street crime coupled with stories about handcuffing the
police, the news media would also disclose the statistics relating to ex-
clusionary rulings by our courts, the public would be reassured. If the
news media would publish the fact that 75 per cent of persons charged
with crime plead guilty, that only 12 per cent go to trial, 5 and in that
12 per cent exclusionary rulings occur only in a small fraction of the
cases, perspective would be restored and the public would be in a better
position to make a judgment as to whether the protection we all derive
from the Bill of Rights is worth the candle. Unfortunately, too little
publicity has been given the article by the Honorable David C. Acheson,
until recently United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
appearing in the December, 1964, issue of the Journal of the Bar Asso-
ciation of the District of Columbia.1" In discussing court decisions in
criminal cases Mr. Acheson, the former chief prosecutor in the nation's
capital, states:
Prosecution procedure has, at most, only the most remote
causal connection with crime. Changes in court decisions and
prosecution procedure would have about the same effect on the
crime rate as an aspirin would have on a tumor of the brain.
17
IV
Police compliance with the protections of the Bill of Rights gives rise
to no problem when the person arrested has sufficient means to obtain a
lawyer immediately. When a person of means or a person connected with
organized crime is arrested, his lawyer meets him at the precinct station.
Such persons are not taken to the back room of the police station for
interrogation unless the lawyer is present, and it has been my experience
15. See Pye, Reflections on Proposals for Reform in Federal Criminal Procedure, 52
Gao. L.J. 675, 693 (1964).
16. Acheson, Crime and the Courts, 31 J.B.A.D.C. 511 (1964).
17. Id. at 513.
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that police generally do not proceed with interrogation of the accused
in the presence of his lawyer. Thus, it is only with reference to the
accused who is not in a position to have his lawyer meet him at the
precinct station that the question of the admissibility of utterances and
confessions arises. Should such persons be at a disadvantage because of
their indigency? This is an important moral as well as legal question
which all of us in the law and in society generally should face. If we are
to profess equality before the law, the right to counsel at every stage of
a criminal proceeding, the right not to be a witness against one's self,
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and arrests, then we
should make certain that these professions and protections apply equally
to rich and poor.
It is with reference to the moral and legal commitment that the type
of trial a man receives should not depend upon his pocketbook that
Congress passed the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.8 Provision was made
in that Act for counsel to represent the indigent as soon as they are
presented before the United States Commissioner. Since production be-
fore the Commissioner may not be delayed for purposes of interrogation
and all persons are now not only entitled to but may have, irrespective
of ability to pay, a lawyer to represent them before the Commissioner,
the problem of secret interrogation of a lonely defendant in the back
room of the police station should be eliminated. At least, statements
made to or taken by the police after arrest but in the absence of counsel
should be excluded from evidence.
Mallory, Escobedo, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, and Rule 5(a)
do not provide answers to all the problems which may arise in criminal
proceedings. There will always be problems when the state has under-
taken to charge one of its citizens with crime and to provide for his
prosecution, but we are nevertheless making progress in eliminating
some of the more serious problems in the more important cases which
have plagued the administration of justice. It is hoped that the right to
counsel, beginning at the time of arrest, will make a marked change in
future state and federal proceedings, insofar as those proceedings relate
to the investigation of felonies.
A difficulty arises, however, with respect to the right to counsel where
the crime charged is of a lesser degree. In addition to felonies, there are
misdemeanors and so-called petty offenses. It is clear, at least under the
federal practice, that a man charged with a misdemeanor has a right to
counsel under the sixth amendment. Gideon involved a felony, and con-
sequently it is not authority for the proposition that the sixth amendment,
insofar as it would extend the right to counsel to misdemeanors, is appli-
cable to the states. Many states already recognize their obligation in
18. 78 STAT. 552, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964)
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this regard. One need be no prophet to predict that before long there
will be another "Gideon case" before the Supreme Court in which the
defendant, without benefit of counsel, is convicted of a misdemeanor.
In neither the federal nor the state courts does it seem that the right
to counsel has been respected as to petty offenses, for it is indeed doubt-
ful that the sixth amendment relates to such offenses. At common law
there was a right to trial by jury with respect to felonies and mis-
demeanors, but petty offenses were tried only before a judge. Since the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial is limited to felonies and mis-
demeanors, the sixth amendment right to counsel presumably is likewise
so limited. Perhaps this limitation, in addition to having a foundation
in law, has also a foundation in necessity. Petty offenders are brought
in from the streets in great numbers and their cases are disposed of
quickly, if not immediately. The assignment of counsel in each such case
may involve keeping the accused in custody longer to await counsel than
he would have to serve if found guilty. It would also be difficult to find
lawyers to defend all the petty offense cases that are brought before all
of the minor magistrates throughout the country.
Nevertheless, people do go to jail for petty offense violations, some-
times for rather substantial periods of time. Consequently, some thought
must be given to legal representation even in petty cases. Perhaps a
public defender present in the magistrate's court at all times could be
the answer to the problem. It should be remembered that it is in the
magistrate's court where the possibility of miscarriages of justice looms
largest-miscarriages that often result from the ignorance or the outright
corruption of the magistrate himself. Magistrates are often laymen ap-
pointed under circumstances not necessarily conducive to the interests of
justice. In fact, some magistrates are still paid according to the number
of persons they convict and the amount of fines they impose.
V
The right of the indigent to be represented in a criminal case at all
critical stages is a subject of paramount importance in our administra-
tion of criminal justice today. By far the great majority of criminal
defendants are indigents. While it is true that economic and social con-
ditions may alone explain the preponderance of criminal cases involving
indigents, former warden Lawes of Sing Sing had a slightly different
explanation:
If a wealthy man, or the son of a wealthy man, kills he is
insane or deranged and usually either goes scot free or to an
insane asylum. If a poor and friendless man kills, he is a sane
man who committed wilful murder for which he must die.19
19. LAWES, LIFE AND DA'rH iN SING SING 248 (1928).
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Be that as it may, a word should be said about those cases in which
the defendant is ready, willing and able to pay for counsel but, because
of his personal unpopularity, the unpopularity of the cause he represents,
or the crime with which he is charged, is unable to obtain counsel. It
would be less than candid not to admit that the reputation of a criminal
defendant very often rubs off on his counsel. This, of course, is an un-
speakable situation, yet it is a fact of life about which very little is
being done. Vignettes from the history of our own country make it
crystal clear that a lawyer who undertakes to represent an unpopular
client or cause runs the risk of losing his law business as well as his
reputation. John Peter Zenger's two lawyers were disbarred. John Adams
and his family were subjected to all manner of public abuse after he
appeared to defend British soldiers who had participated in the Boston
Massacre. More recently, Judge Harold Medina is said to have been
vilified, even by some members of his own family, for representing a
Nazi accused of espionage during the Second World War."
Our brothers in the medical profession and in the ministry are accorded
more protection than the lawyer. Under his hippocratic oath a doctor is
bound to minister to anyone in need of care, and a clergyman must al-
ways act on the assumption that no soul is beyond redemption. But
even as to these professions, the compulsory character of their service
has not protected the doctors or the clergymen from public wrath where
the public has disapproved of the beneficiaries of their ministrations.
Nor has the compulsory nature of their calling always been respected
by the doctors or the ministers themselves. For example, the following
report of the funeral of accused presidential assassin Lee Harvey Oswald
appeared in Time:
Texas ministers, for all their talk about the shame of Dallas
and the redemption of sin, seemed notably reluctant to pre-
side. So the police chief telephoned the Rev. Louis A. Saunders,
executive secretary of the Fort Worth Council of Churches,
who left off watching Kennedy's funeral on TV and went to the
cemetery. "Someone," he explained, had to help this family."2
In England, "... [a] barrister is always bound, except under very
special circumstances, to accept, upon tender of a proper fee, a retainer
in a case which merits the judgment of the court."22 The British public
understands the compulsory nature of the barrister's work and, conse-
quently, the client's reputation is not confused with the reputation of the
barrister. The tragedy in this country is that there is no tradition of
compulsory service in our bar. As a matter of fact, ABA Canon 31
20. Medina, Courage and Independence of the Bar, 25 OHio B.J. 381 (1952).
21. Time, Dec. 6, 1963, p. 33A.
22. Tuttle, The Ethics of Advocacy, 18 A.B.A.J. 849 (1932).
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specifically provides: "No lawyer is obliged to act either as advisor or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has
the right to decline employment."2 3 Thus, there may be good reason for
the public here to identify the lawyer with his client. According to
Canon 31, a lawyer can refuse a retainer. Therefore, it would be in-
appropriate to attempt to educate the public as to the responsibility of
the lawyer to accept employment until Canon 31 is expunged from the
Canons of Professional Ethics. If we want the public to believe that
lawyers must accept clients, lawyers should begin to do just that. Until
the public is convinced of the compulsory nature of a lawyer's service,
every lawyer representing an unpopular client runs the risk of being
tarred with unpopularity.
Perhaps the tradition of the bar in this country with reference to
accepting retainers should approach the position taken by Mr. Justice
Brandeis. A member of the bar approached the great Justice and ad-
vised him that he had been requested to represent a most unpopular
client. He showed the Justice many letters from friends suggesting strongly
that he refuse the retainer. He asked for the Justice's advice. It was as
follows: "Before you reject this cause, I suggest you consider resigning
from the bar. On further consideration, you might even resign from the
human race." With respect to the duty of the bar to represent unpopular
clients, Mr. Justice Brandeis may not have overstated the position even
slightly.
Therefore, with the resurgence of interest in the criminal law, sparked
by the decisions of the Supreme Court, it has now become the responsi-
bility of the lawyer to employ this new approach to criminal law. The
bench and bar should take steps to educate the public with respect to
the lawyer-client relationship. With public education the reputation of
the client or the client's cause should not rub off on the lawyer.
23. Canon 31, Canons of Professional Ethics, American Bar Association.
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